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INTRODUCTION

How should lawyers resolve conflicting professional duties? On the one
hand, lawyers owe a duty to their clients;1 on the other, a duty to the court.2

* Associate Director, International LawProgrammes, University ofOxford. Iam grateful to
participants at workshops held at the University of Oklahoma and Washington &Lee Law Schools
and to several barristers, especially Leon de Costa and Alex Mehta, for the opportunity to discuss
drafts of this Article.
1. See, e.g., THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR, CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF
ENGLAND & WALES para. 203(iii) (1990) [hereinafter BAR CODE] (describing a barrister's duty

to act for a client regardless ofthe type of case or his personal beliefs about the client); THE LAW
at 386 (Nicola

SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS annex 21 A,

Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT] (stating that

advocates "must promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the client's
best interest"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL

CODE] (stating that lawyers should zealously represent clients while also complying with the law);
SOLICITORS' PRACTICE RULES 1990 AND ASSOCIATED CODES, R. 1.01(c) (1990) [hereinafter
SOLICITORS' RULES] (stating a solicitor must not take any action which impairs or is likely to

impair her duty to act in the client's best interests).
2. See, e.g., BAR CODE, supra note 1, at para. 208 ("A practising banister must assist the
court in the administration ofjustice and must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the
Court."); MODEL CODE, supra note 1,at EC 7-39 ("[P]roper functioning of the adversary system
depends upon cooperation between lawyers and tribunals initializing procedures which will
preserve the impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional processes prompt and just.");
SOLICITORS' RULES, supra note 1, at R. 1.01 (0 (stating that a solicitor must not do anything that
impairs the solicitor's duty to the court).
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They also have responsibilities for the administration of justice,3 the legal
profession,4 and the legal system itself.5 Lawyers are inevitably confronted with
many ethical dilemmas, and such conflicts are often "the most difficult."6 In
practice, economic and other pressures may influence lawyers'
decisionmaking, sometimes to the detriment of their clients7 and sometimes at
the expense of courts and third parties."
So, how can appropriate and effective incentives be created so that lawyers
respond as "professionals"? Indeed, what conduct is "professional," given the
complexity and dynamism of legal practice? If professional duties really are
conflicting, can they be reconciled? When there are honest differences of
opinion about what a lawyer should do in particular conflict scenarios, whose
interpretation should be accepted?

3. See, e.g., BARCODE,supranote 1,atpara. 201(a)(ii) (stating that all barristers cannot act
in a way that prejudices the administration ofjustice); MODEL CODE, supra note 1,at DR 1102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (1998) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(stating that conduct that is prejudiced to the administration ofjustice is professional misconduct).
4. See, e.g., BAR CODE, supranote 1, at para. 201 (a)(iii) (stating that a barrister must not act
in a manner "likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession.., or otherwise bring
the legal profession into disrepute"); MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at Canon I (listing ethical
considerations for lawyers for maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession);
SOLICITORS' RULES, supra note 1, at R. 1.01 (d) (stating that a solicitor must not do anything that
compromises the good reputation of her profession).
5. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 8 (listing ethical considerations for
lawyers in improving the legal system).
6. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975); see W. William Hodes,
AcceptingandRejectingClients-TheMoralAutonomyoftheSecond-to-ile-LastLawyerin
Town,
48 U. KAN.L. REV. 977,978 (2000) ("The acid test ofethical lawyering is rarely what to do in the
face ofcrisis.... Instead, the excruciating difficulty oflawpractice is thepervasivenessofethical
challenges.").
7. See, e.g., MIKE MCCONVILLE ET AL., STANDING ACCUSED: THE ORGANISATION AND
PRACTICES OF CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYERS IN BRITAIN 10-11 (1994) (suggesting that the
prosecutor's goal of winning the case often influences the construction of the case against the
criminal defendants); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S INCHARGE 22-23
(1974) (illustrating how critics of the legal profession feel lawyers give insufficient attention to
the possibility of the professional's bias in determining the client's interest); AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING INTHE
LEGAL PROCESS 21 (1995) ("In the standard analysis of the professions, lawyers are presented
either as agents moving tactically toward their clients' . . . goals... [and] best interests or as
opportunists using the client's case to work out their own agenda." (citations omitted)).
8. In highly competitive markets, lawyers' duties to courts or third parties are inevitably
marginalized. ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN

ENGLAND AND WALES 87-89 (1999).
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In the United States, there seems to be a crisis of legal professionalism.'

While some lawyers simply ignore any public service ideal, others rely on it to
justify behavior regarded by many as unprofessional. These lawyers are said

to be too client-centered, too legalistic, and too zealous at the expense of
justice and the wider public interest.'" The proliferation of civility codes and
commissions on professionalism reflects these concerns." But some believe
that "more than vague exhortations to 'professionalism' is needed to address
bar leaders' "pervasive unwillingness" to acknowledge that lawyers have any
public responsibilities.' 2 In any case, professional regulation may be more
about protecting lawyers from market pressures than about promoting justice.' 3

9. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the PervasiveMethod, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 33 (1992)
[hereinafterEthics by the PervasiveMethod] (citing concerns about the legal profession including
"the frequency ofincompetence, neglect, incivility, and adversarial abuse; and theinadequacy of
institutional responses"); see also John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism:
AcceptingResponsibilityandImplementing Change,28 VAL.U. L.REv. 563,563 (1994) ("[T]he
public perception problems lawyers face today are deeper and more widespread than any the
profession has ever faced before."); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism,63
FORDHAM L. REV 949, 949 (1995) (noting that the decline in the legal profession has a negative
effect on society); Harry T. Edwards, The GrowingDisjunctionBetween LegalEducationandthe
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992) ("For sometime now, I have been deeply
concerned about the growing disjunction between legal education and the legal
profession. ... This disjunction calls into question our status as an honorable profession.");
Deborah L. Rhode, The ProfessionalismProblem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 283 (1998)
("Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline."); Patrick J. Schlitz, Legal Ethics in
Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the MoralFormation of the Novice
Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705,707 (1998) (recognizing "the pressure on novice lawyers to act
unethically" while senior lawyers and law professors have not assisted these lawyers in resisting
such urges). ContraCharles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not to LikeAbout Being a Lawyer?,
109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1450 (2000) (asserting "a far more positive opinion of private sector
lawyering").
10. An example of this type oflawyer might be Michael Katz, "who operate[d] an eviction
mill for Los Angeles landlords: ... [and] boasted 'I'm a hired gun, bottom line. Somebody pays
me money to go out there and fight their battle with this tenant. I like the fight."' Richard L. Abel,
RevisioningLawyers, in LAWYERS INSOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 1, 15 (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) [hereinafter Revisioning Lawyers]; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 628 (1985) [hereinafter Ethical
Perspectives] ("Reported cases and surveys reveal a striking incidence of overly zealous
representation ranging from garden variety discovery abuse to suppression of evidence and
complicity in fraud or perjury.").
11. See ProfessionalismInitiatives, 52 S.C. L. REV. 747 (2001) [hereinafter Directory].
12. Robert W. Gordon,A CollectiveFailureofNerve: The Bar'sResponse to Kaye Scholer,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 315, 321-22 (1998).
13. See, for example, the work of Richard L. Abel, applying the theories of MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977) to the

legal professions in the United States and England and Wales. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS 227 (1989) [hereinafter ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS]; RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 10-15 (1988); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA

PromulgateEthicalRules?59 TEX. L. REv. 639,653-67 (1981). See alsoDeborahL. Rhode, Why
theABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspectiveon ProfessionalCodes,59 TEX. L.REV. 689,702-06

(1981) (finding that minimizing competition from both external and internal sources has been a
principal motivation behind professional regulation). According to Abel, professionalism is "a

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 697

But, what if there is a genuine desire to enhance the professionalism of
lawyers? Mark J. Osiel claims that "the public service ideal of the independent
professional functions simultaneously as an ideology, masking unpleasant
institutional realities, and as a noble aspiration, prompting successful attempts
at piecemeal improvement."' 4 Lawyer decisionmaking in practice may well be
influenced by "complex interactions" involving a "mix of ingredients," of
which abstract professional ideals and narrow economic interests play only a
part.' Could a change in the mixture produce a different ideology, a different
reality?
Comparative analysis suggests that it could. In England and Wales, 16 the
ideology of professionalism is not so client-centered as in the United States.
For example, in the English bar there is a strong professional culture which
serves to empower the individual lawyer to act independently of the client and
to exercise "professional judgement" in conflict scenarios. As a result, the
lawyers' duty to the court and the legal system plays a greater countervailing
role than in the United States.
Comparative analysis does not, of course, tell you which system is better,
but it may provide some insights into how a certain kind of professionalism can
help to counterbalance competing pressures. Lawyers necessarily act in terms
of "ethical conceptions that are shared with other members of the lawyer's
reference groups."' 7 Lawyers' decisionmaking is affected by a "'collegial
influence' . . . the multiple and sometimes overlapping 'communities of

specific historical formation in which the members of an occupation exercise a substantial degree
ofcontrol over the market for theirservices, usually through an occupational association." Richard
L. Abel, TheDecline ofProfessionalism?,49 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986). Abel also maintains that
the purpose ofprofessional associations is to "seek or defend material benefits and social status"
of lawyers. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra, at 305.
14. Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists,Aristocrats,andEntrepreneurs,103 HARV. L.
REV. 2009, 2021 (1990) (reviewing 1 LAWYERS INSOCIETY: THE COMMONLAW WORLD (Richard
L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD
(Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); 3 LAWYERS INSOCIETY: COMPARATIVE
THEORIES (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989)); see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY,
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT (1987)
(discussing the public-interest role played by bar associations).
15. Richard J. Maiman et al., The Future ofLegal Professionalism in Practice,2 LEGAL
ETHICS 71, 71 (1999) (describing the mix as: "personal values, preferences and identities; formal
and informal norms of groups of professional colleagues; local legal rules and institutions; the
demands of work itself; and specific workplace and client characteristics"); see also HUBERT J.
O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL PRESSURES IN PRIVATE

PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 66-72 (1963) (stating that lawyers' reasons for accepting cases depend
partly on whether the cases constitute a peripheral, minor, or major part of their practice).
16. There are three legal systems in the United Kingdom: England and Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland. This article focuses on the system in England and Wales.
17. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,A Lawyer'sMoral andEthicalDiscretion,RESEARCHING LAW,
Spring 1997, at 1; see also W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (stating "a potentially productive approach to handling
ethical dilemmas in lawyering is to turn to the values of the legal profession that derive from the
social function of lawyers and from the traditions and practices of the legal profession").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss3/14

4

2001]

Whelan: Ethical Conflicts in Legal Practice: Creating Professional Respon
ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN LEGAL PRACTICE

practice' to which most lawyers belong."'" A "central issue in examining
professional practice is how collegial influence can be established and
meaningful in the settings where professionals do their work."19'
The English comparison provides an opportunity to evaluate these ideas.
There are, of course, many differences between the two countries, especially
the division of the English legal profession into solicitors and barristers. 0
However, there are many more similarities than differences. The "standard
conception"'" of the lawyer's role is the same in both countries.' Within
adversarial legal systems, a lawyer's role is to put aside personal views and to
abide by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.'
Representation of a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or
activities.' An advocate's duty is to argue; it is for the court to decide the
outcome.' Lawyers are expected to do the best they can for the client, so that
"[t]he client's case should receive from the adviser the same level of care and

18. Maiman et al., supra note 15, at 71.
19. Id.at 83.
20. Traditionally, solicitors (currently around 90,000 in private practice) were viewed as
generalists and barristers (around 9,000 in private practice) as specialists. RICHARDL. ABEL, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION INENGLAND AND WALES 114, 139. This view is increasingly difficult to
sustain. While barristers had exclusive tights of audience in the higher courts and could only
receive clients via a solicitor, id. at 35, these restrictions on practice have also been undermined
in recent years. The Courts and Legal Services Act, c.41, § 17 (1990) abolished barristers'
exclusive rights of audience, see Access to Justice Act, c. 22, § 36 (1999), and professional rules
were relaxed in the 1990s to allow certain potential clients-such as accountants, surveyors,
citizens' advice bureaus and certain organizations such as the police, trade unions, professional
organizations and medical defense bodies-to approach barristers directly. However, entry into
the two branches remains distinct as does professional regulation. See BOON &LEVIN, supranote
8, ch. 5 &6.
21. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, inTHE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 84 (David Luban ed., 1984); DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE xix (1988); see also Ted SchneyerMoralPhilosophys StandardMisconception ofLegal
Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529, 1534 (explaining that the "standard conception" of lawyers is
based on the principles of neutrality and partisanship).
22. See BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 33, (stating "the narrative of the legal profession
in the UKis remarkably similar to that describedby Hazard" (referring to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Future ofLegal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991)).
23. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at DR 7-101; MODELRULES, supra note 3, at R. 1.2(a);
BAR CODE, supra note 1,at para. 207(a); GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 1,
at para. 2.3(a).
24. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 1.2(b).
25. See LEO PAGE, FIRST STEPS INADVOCACY 16 (1943).
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attention as the client would himself exert if he had the knowledge and the
means."2 6 In so doing, the lawyer will give priority to clients' interests."
These characteristics of neutrality and partisanship are captured in the
notion of zealous advocacy in Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code: "A [1]awyer
[s]hould [r]epresent a [c]lient [z]ealously [w]ithin the [b]ounds of the [f]aw."28
In American literature, a frequently cited example of the commitment a zealous
lawyer should give to a client is Lord Brougham's defense of Queen Caroline
against the King's charge of adultery in 1821.9 Lord Brougham stated:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save
that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and
costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his
first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that
of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences,
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in
confusion.30
Brougham's view captures nicely the ideal of zealous advocacy.
Many professional rules reinforce the standard conception of the lawyers'
role.3 ' In England, the standard conception of an advocate's role is reinforced

26.

THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVS., 1 FINAL REPORT para. 3.18(e) (1979)

[hereinafter THE ROYAL COMM'N ON LEGAL SERVS.]; see also LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTOF SOLICITORS para. 21.20 (Nicola Taylor ed., 8th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT] (creating a duty for criminal defense solicitors "to say

on behalf of the client what the client should properly say for himself or herself if the client
possessed the requisite skill and knowledge").

27. See GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 26, at R. 1.01 (c) (requiring a
solicitor "to act in the best interests of the client"); id.atR. 12.08 (requiring a solicitor to exercise
diligence in carrying out the client's instructions); see also BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 183
("The mostbasic premise ofprofessional ethics is that the client's interests should take precedence
over those of the lawyer.").
28. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 7.
29. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188-89 (1973).
30. Id.; see also TheBench andtheBar,40 LAWTIMES 16, 17 (1864). In England, modem
day advocates are required "to promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means
his lay client's best interests and do so withoutregard to his own interests or to any consequences
to himself or to any other person," BAR CODE, supra note I, at para. 207(a), including fellow
advocates ormembers ofthe legal profession. GUIDETOTHE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supranote
1, at para.2.3(a).
31. See LUBAN, supra note 21, at 11 ("[T]he principle ofpartisanship is generally taken as
a credo by lawyers in nonadvocate roles just as much as by courtroom lawyers."); DONALD
NICOLSON & JULIAN WEBB, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS 55 (1999) ("[A]dversarialism casts a
long shadowover the legal system. Many conductrules... reflect adversary assumptions.., even
in non-contentious matters.").
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss3/14
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symbolically by the wearing of wigs and gowns,32 which emphasize the
professional rather than personal role being performed. A professional rule,
known as the 'cab-rank' rule, requires barristers to take cases within their
expertise.33 This rule reinforces the legitimacy of the neutrality and partisanship
roles-the barrister is not personally identified with the client or the cause."
Despite the standard conception that a lawyer's professional duty is owed
to the client, professional rules seek to further the goals of the adversary system
in both countries by qualifying or even constraining the lawyers' duty of
zealous advocacy to the client. In the United States, "proper functioning of the
adversary system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and tribunals in
utilizing procedures which will preserve the impartiality of tribunals and make
their decisional processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the
obligation of lawyers to represent their clients zealously within the framework
of the law.""a Thus, an "advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the
fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal
' Similarly, lawyers in England owe a duty to
procedure." 36
the court.3 In both
countries, advocates are expected to disclose to the court legal authority even
if it is directly adverse to the client's position.3"
Concerned with preventing the administration of justice from falling into
disrepute, Rule 32 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client."39 Lawyers therefore should not delay "for the purpose
of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or

32. The wearing of black gowns was introduced "as a temporary measure" in the 17th
century. Solicitor-advocates wear gowns but not wigs. Solicitor Advocates Do Not Wear Wigs,
THE TIMEs, July 20, 1994, at 41.
33. In the interests of access to justice, a barrister must take a case within their field of
expertise, subject only to the barrister having time to take the case and a reasonable fee being
offered. BAR CODE, supra note 1,at para. 203, 501-03.
34. Arguably, attorneys and solicitors, who have freedom to reject clients, find it harder to
justify representing unpopular clients or causes. Monroe Freedman argues that lawyers should
have freedom to refuse a case "on any standard he or she deems appropriate." MONROE
FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 49 (1990). ContraDavid Goldberger, Clients
Everyone Hates, LITIG., Spring 1995, at 10, 10 (arguing that every attorney has an ethical
obligation to represent unpopular clients); Michael Tigar, Defending,74 Tax. L. REv. 101, 109
(1995) (explaining that when a lawyer represents an unpopular client, she is actually reaffirming
justice); but cf.Hodes, supra note 6, at 990 (offering the author's experience of defending "an
anti-semitic racist client"); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics,and theFirstAmendment: Should a
BlackLawyerRepresentthe Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO.WASH. L.REv. 1030 (1995) (illustrating the
point by telling how an African-American lawyer represented the grand dragon of the Texas
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan).
35. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 7-39.
36. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 3.1 cmt. 1.
37. See BAR CODE, supra note 1, atpara. 208; SOLICITORS' RULES, supra note 1, at R. 1(f).
38. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at DR 7-106(B)(1); MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R.
3.3(a)(3); BAR CODE, supra note 1, at para. 610(c).
39. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 3.2
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repose."' Professional misconduct includes conduct that is "prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice."'
Lawyers also have responsibilities for the legal profession and the legal
system. In the United States, lawyers should "[a]ssist in [m]aintaining the
[i]ntegrity and [c]ompetence of the [l]egal [p]rofession"42 and in "[i]mproving
the [l]egal [s]ystem."43 In England, a solicitor shall not do anything to
compromise "the good repute of the solicitor or the solicitor's profession."" In
the United States, the Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility states that a
lawyer does not violate the lawyer's duty to represent a client zealously by
"acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel" and thereby "being
punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments."45 Similarly, in England,
solicitors are subject to a duty of fairness towards third parties. ' They must not
use their positions as solicitors to take unfair advantage, for example, by
writing offensive letters to third parties. This principle modifies the general
duty to act in the best interests of the client.
Despite the similarities in the lawyer's role and in professional rules, when
it comes to potentially conflicting duties, there seems to be a marked contrast
in Anglo-American ideologies of professionalism, with direct consequences
both for clients and the administration of justice. These different ideologies
will be compared in Part II of this Article. In order to focus the discussion,
particular attention will be paid to the role of the advocate in the courtroom.
While by no means typical of what lawyers do, advocacy and litigation are
area:s in which potential conflicts arise very clearly.' The lawyer's advocacy
role is in many ways the paradigm for much of the academic analysis of
professional responsibility.4"
Part III of this Article will consider some implications of the English
approach. It is argued that professional responsibility must be based on the
individual lawyer's exercise of professional judgment. To create this kind of
professional responsibility requires a new approach to professional regulation
based on the development of principles which are clear, appropriate, and
enforceable within particular areas of legal practice. Part IV of this Article will
conclude that to improve lawyer behavior, the profession must not rely on

40. Id. at R. 3.2 cmt. I.
41. Id. at R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE, supra note I, at DR 1-102(A)(5).
42. MODEL CODE, supra note 1,at Canon 1.
43. Id. at Canon 8.
44. SOLICITORS' RULES, supra note 1, at R. 1(d).
45. MODEL CODE, supra note 1,at DR 7-101(A)(1).
46. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 26, at R. 17.0 1.
47. According to Boon and Levin, "[T]he economic interests of the advocate, the
expectations of the advocate's clients and peers and, indeed, the logic of the adversarial system
may encourage an aggressive amoral stance." BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 32.
48. See NICOLSON & WEBB, supra note 31, at 182; DAVID PANNICK, ADVOCATES 127-69
(1992); Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibilityofthe CriminalDefenseLawyer: The
Three HardestQuestions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470-74 (1966).
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changes or alterations in professional codes, but instead must impose a duty on
each individual lawyer to exercise professional judgment.
II. ANGLO-AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES OF PROFESSIONALISM
A.

The American Ideology ofAdvocacy49

In the United States, a "libertarian" ideology,s° which includes the "image
of the adversarial advocate who places [the] client's cause above every other
consideration," predominates.5 American lawyers "long ago abandoned all but
a pretence of serving any wider interest than that of clients." 2 The libertarian
ideology "privatizes the lawyer's role" 3 and undermines the "norm that part
of the lawyer's role is to represent the public purposes of the legal system to
the client, as well as the client to the legal system." 4 Robert Gordon states:
[There has been an] uncontrolled expansion of libertarian
ideology into lawyers' common consciousness-to the point
where lawyers have come to feel genuinely affronted and
indignant when any authority tries to articulate a public
obligation of lawyers that may end up putting them at odds
with clients. We have no public obligations, they claim; we
are private agents for private parties ... ; our loyalties to

clients must be absolute and undivided."5
Suggestions that clients might be denied their attorney's exclusive
attention can produce a critical response from practitioners. For example, when
Chief Justice Burger stated that "an attorney's ethical duty to advance the
interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty to comply with the
law and standards of professional conduct; it specifically ensures that the client

49. See William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: ProceduralJusticeandProfessional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 [hereinafter Ideology] (discussing the American ideology of

advocacy at length).
50. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085
(1988) [hereinafter EthicalDiscretion];see also Ideology, supra note 49, at 34 (summarizing

principles of advocate ideology).
51. BooN &LEVIN, supra note 8, at 107.
52. BOON& LEvIN, supranote 8,at 107 (citing Jonathan R. Macey, ProfessorSimon on the
Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick's Place in Casablanca,23 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 323 (1998)).
53. Gordon, supra note 12, at 321.

54. Id. at 320-21.
55. Id. at 320.
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may not use false evidence,"'56 his view was criticized in one of the leading
texts of professional responsibility.57
Libertarians endorse "the traditional ethic"58 of the American lawyer-to
give "'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the lawyer's] utmost
learning and ability."' 59 Zealousness, it is claimed, continues to be "'the
fundamental principle of the law of lawyering."' 6 Professionalism means
zealous advocacy, the only caveat being that the means and ends should
themselves be lawful.6 '
A classic example of the client-first approach occurred in Sprung v.
Negwer Materials, Inc.,62 where, after receiving a summons and petition,
defendant's counsel took steps to obtain time to file an answer.6 3 However, due
to a clerical error the documents were mailed to the defendant's insurance
company and not to the court or to plaintiff's counsel. ' The plaintiff's counsel,
upon receiving no response to the petition, "quite properly" sought and
obtained a default judgment of $1.5 million.65 This judgment was subject to
being set aside within thirty days in the discretion of the trial court.66
During this thirty day period, plaintiff's counsel became aware that defense
counsel was proceeding on the mistaken assumption that the case was properly
pending.67 He realized that "the extension papers must not have reached him
or the courthouse."" He responded by calling his client to tell him that an
answer had been filed within the thirty days.69 He told the client that he could
talk to the other side who would probably file a motion to set the default
judgment aside.7" The client, when informed that he could "lose his verdict" if
this happened, told the lawyer not to contact the other side.7' Accordingly, the
lawyer waited the full thirty days, plus ten more, which would be the normal

56. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
57. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ETAL., THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING 372-73 (3d
ed. 1999).
58. Monroe H. Freedman, The EthicalDangerof"' Civility'and"Professionalism"', 6CRIM.
JUST. J., Spring 1998, at 17, 17 [hereinafter EthicalDanger].
59. CANONS OF PROF'L EmICs EC 15 (1908).
60. EthicalDanger,supra note 58, at 17, 17 (citing G. C. HAZARD & W. W. HODES, THE
LAW OFLAWYERING 17 (Supp. 1988)).
61. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 7-19; Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalismin

the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY L.J.467, 470 (1992).
62. 775 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1989).
63. Id. at 98.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 107 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 109 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 107.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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appeal time.72 He knew that if the situation remained the same until the end of
the thirty-day period, the default judgment "would be infinitely more difficult
to set aside."73 "Knowing these circumstances, [the lawyer] deliberately
refrained from answering his mail, or even acknowledging the
communication."74
Several of the justices expressed their strong disapproval of the plaintiff's
lawyer's conduct. Chief Justice Blackmar was particularly critical, stating that
the lawyer's conduct "should shock all right-thinking lawyers.... [T]his kind
of conduct is unacceptable in our profession. The processing of civil litigation
requires that lawyers deal with each other in accordance with the highest
standards of trust and candor.""5 The Chief Justice was not denying that a
lawyer has a duty to advance the client's interests-he himself wished to be
'
remembered as a lawyer "who went all out for his clients."76
Nor was the Chief
Justice proposing that "professional courtesy" should prevail over a lawyer's
duty to his client; nevertheless, a lawyer should use "honorable means."" He
himself would "stop short of taking advantage of a mistake known to [him]"
and would not "sanction a situation in which the Court permits other lawyers
to get away with conduct which I consider the legal equivalent of fraud.""
However, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to set aside the default
judgment, pointing to the clerical error as showing negligence on the part ofthe
defendant's lawyer.79 Monroe Freedman was critical of the Chief Justice and
the other judges who criticized the lawyer.8 Freedman argued that the lawyer
was ethically required to obey his client's instructions,8" and the judges' view
and the whole idea of "civility" and "professionalism" constituted an ethical
danger in itself.82
It has been argued that a libertarian ideology represents a slippery slope to
excessive zeal and to uncontrolled instrumentalism."3 While the ideology starts
with a compelling and powerful image" of the criminal lawyer as a bastion
between the individual and the power of the state--"the fearless advocate who

72. Id.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 109 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 110.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 102.
80. EthicalDanger,supra note 58, at 18.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. David J. Luban, Milgram Revisited, RESEARCHING LAW, Spring 1998, at 1, 9.
84. See BooN &LEVIN, supra note 8, at 317 ("Much of the rationale for the current ethics
of lawyering is based on criminal representation.").
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champions a client threatened with loss of life and liberty by government
oppression"----it is easily extended to civil litigation86 and beyond."
Doing all one can for a client within the bounds of the law-playing
hardball "according to the rules" 8 -- couldbe understood to mean doing almost
anything. At one extreme, there are no bounds to the law89 and at the other, law
can be seen as indeterminate and open to almost any interpretation." If giving
an unresponsive, obstructionist, but literally true answer in the witness box
does not constitute pejury,9' why should a lawyer not advise a client on how
to achieve this?
If lawyers make ethical choices, they do so at the time of appointment.
Once they accept a client, though they may in certain circumstances withdraw
if the client insists upon a "repugnant or imprudent" objective,92 the lawyer will
not generally view any lawful client objective in this way. Rather, a libertarian
ethic demands that lawyers should do everything they can to win their client's
case, including using any law or any procedural mechanism, regardless of its
purpose, to their advantage; withholding from the court or the other side
information not legally required to be disclosed; discrediting truthful witnesses
in certain circumstances;93 taking affirmative steps to discredit the

85. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future ofLegalEthics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1243 (1991).
86. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962) (stating that
there is no duty to notify the other side in a personal injury claim of an immediate life-threatening
condition).
87. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Bargainingin the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
LawyerDisputeBargainingRole, 51 MD. L. REV. I(1992) (discussing ethical considerations in
negotiations); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in Negotiations, 75 IoWA L. REV. 1219,
1255-61 (1990) (discussing loyalty and zeal as justification for lying in negotiations); see also
BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 327-35 (stating "adversarial litigation encourages adversarial
bargaining"); PANNICK, supra note 48, at 127-69 (discussing the morality of advocates).
88. W. William Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer
Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?, 87 KY. L.J. 1019, 1032 (1999)
[hereinafter Rethinking the Way Law is Taught].
89. See, e.g., William H. Simon, ShouldLawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. &MARY L. REV.
217,237-38 (1996) (analyzing theunethical actions ofthe lawyerplayed by Paul Newman in "The
Verdict" to locate a key witness).
90. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES passim (1987)
(discussing the role of liberalism in law); Frederick Schauer, Formalism,97 YALEL.J. 509 (1988)
(discussing the aversion to formalism in decisionmaking).
91. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1973).
92. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 1.16(b)(3) (assuming withdrawal does not have a
materially adverse affect on clients' interests).
93. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS INAN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-49
(1975).
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prosecution's case even when the lawyer knows it is accurate;94 making factual
assertions to exploit the jury's possible prejudice;" and facilitating perjury.96
Defying everything they know about law and about how legal decisions are
understood by others in the legal system, when it comes to making ethical
judgments, libertarian lawyers feel they have no choice97 because the client
comes first.9 No wonder libertarian lawyers such as Monroe Freedman and
William Hodes resist the professionalism movement. Hodes accused a judge
of being an "equal opportunity lawyer bash[er]" for claiming it was unethical
for criminal defense lawyers to actively defend "factually guilty" clients on
other than technical grounds. 9 For Freedman, the professionalism movement
constitutes an attempt to subordinate zealous representation which, if
successful, would leave zealous advocacy "'dead in the water."''
B. The English Approach
The instinctive response of the English barrister in professional conflict
situations is very different from that of the American lawyer. Barristers easily
get "professionally embarrassed." The Bar Code defines the circumstances in
which, due to professional embarrassment,'' a barrister should cease to act for
a client."° They include circumstances where continuing to act would involve
a breach of professional conduct rules. °3
94. See Harry I. Subin, The CriminalLawyer's "Different Mission Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 128 (1987).
95. See Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Casefor UnmitigatedZeal on Behalfof
People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 925, 931 (2000).
96. See Ethical Danger,supra note 58, at 1478-82; see also Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and Some Possibilities,1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613, 631 (1986) (challenging the belief that discrediting a truthful witness is
permissible in all circumstances). However, many would draw the line at perjury. See, e.g., Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (holding Sixth Amendment not violated when attorney
refuses to assist client in perjury); Hazard, supra note 85, at 1257 n.94 (noting that such advice
to a client"'warrants disbarment"). But, as potentially with any law, what constitutes perjury may
be arguable. See Simon, supranote 89, at 230-33; see alsoBronston,409 U.S. at 361 (attempting
to interpret the federal perjury statute). Lying is just as ambiguous. See William H. Simon,
VirtuousLying: A CritiqueofQuasi-CategoricalMoralism, 12 GEO.J.LEGALETHIcs 433 (1999).
97. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOwITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) ("What a defense attorney 'may' do, he must do, if it is
necessary to defend his client.").
98. Professor Simon describes this as "a style of reasoning that is widely regarded as
discredited." EthicalDiscretion,supranote 50, at 1121; see also Wendel, supra note 17, at 5-6
(stating "lawyers' understanding oflegal ethics is,jurisprudentially speaking, decades behind their
conception of the law as it applies to everyone else").
99. Rethinking the Way Law is Taught, supra note 88, at 1024-25.
100. EthicalDanger,supra note 58, at 18 (quoting Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes &

Dermer, 453 S.E.2d 719, 735 (Ga. 1995)).
101. BAR CODE,supra note 1,para. 201 (a)(iii), (b).
102. The same goes for solicitor-advocates. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, supra
note I, atR. 5.1.
103. BAR CODE,supra note 1,para. 209(c).
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As a result, in England and Wales, ° the collective norm, or instinctive
response, in conflict situations is significantly modified as: "Zeal and
efficiency alone.., do not ensure the doing ofjustice. The just operation of the
legal system depends upon lawyers acting honestly and ethically, and not
deliberately delaying or lengthening the proceedings or employing
obstructionist tactics."' 5 Although a professional person's "first and particular
responsibility is to his client," and for lawyers "this professional duty of
maintaining the client's interests is paramount," it is "subject only to their
direct responsibility to the court."'" A barrister, "as an officer of the court
concerned in the administration of justice.... has an overriding duty to the
court," 7 and an overriding obligation to promote justice, including a duty not
to mislead the court.0 '
The same is true for solicitors. Where their duty to act in the best interests
of the client conflicts with the duty to the court, "the determining factor in
deciding which principle should take precedence must be the public interest,
and especially the public interest in the administration ofjustice."'' 9 Solicitor
advocates have "an overriding duty to the court to ensure in the public interest
that the proper and efficient administration of justice is achieved: they must
assist the court in the administration of justice and must not deceive or
knowingly or recklessly mislead the court..." Lawyers' duties to the court are:
"[I]n reality owed to the larger community which has a vital public interest in
the proper administration of justice. That public interest is indeed the source
of these duties.""'
In England, the two principles-duty to the court and duty to the
client-are reconciled as follows: "The litigant aims to obtain a favourable
result. The advocate aims to persuade the judge to reach a result favourable to
his client by fair means. The advocate, not the litigant must decide which
means are fair in the light of the advocate's training and experience in the
law."".2 Thus, "[a] barrister must not wilfully mislead the court as to the law
nor may he actively mislead the court as to the facts.'' An advocate must not
"mislead the court by stating facts which are untrue, or mislead the judge as to
the true facts, or conceal from the court facts which ought to be drawn to the

104. And it is likely an instinctive response in certain other common law countries, such as
Australia. See D. A. Ipp, Lawyers'Dutiesto the Court, 114 L. Q. REV.63, 65 (1998).
105. Id. at64.
106. THEROYALCOMM'NONLEGALSERVS.,supra note 26, para. 3.18(e) (emphasis added).
107. Rondel v. Worsley, 1 A.C. 191, 227 (1969) (quoting Lord Reid's opinion).
108. BAR CODE, supra note 1, at para. 208.
109. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 26, at para. 1.02(6).
110. GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at para. 2.2.
111. Ipp, supra note 104, at 63 (citing Rondel v. Worsley, 1 A.C. 191,227 (1969) per Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest).
112. Lord Templeman, The Advocate and the Judge, 2 LEGAL ETHics 11 (1999).
113. SaifAli v. Sydney Mitchell & Co., 3 All E.R. 1033, 1042-43 (1978).
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judge's attention."" 4 Barristers must not "connive at a court being wilfully
misled..." 5
The scope of representation depends entirely on the client's instructions;
the advocate's duty "depends on what he is told.""" While the case presented
by one side in court will often be based on inaccurate and occasionally false
evidence, none of this is the advocate's responsibility "so long as his
instructions are to the effect that his case is genuine."".7 Under this theory, if
a client, having proclaimed innocence, instructs counsel to undertake a
vigorous defense and if the result is counsel seeking to discredit truthful
witnesses, counsel is blameless. However, counsel should advise the client of
the risks of undertaking such a defense if it is not valid.
Basing the scope of the representation on clients' instructions leaves plenty
of scope for zealous advocacy. When counsel for multiple defendants crossexamined the victim of a gang rape over a period of twelve days, the judge
stated, when convicting the defendants "'[f]or over thirty hours this girl had to
relive the ordeal in a public court in front of total strangers. Outrageous
suggestions were put to her on your instructions. You, not your counsel, added
insult to injury and heaped further humiliation on her."'..
But, there are limits. An advocate has a "duty to put before the court the
facts with which he is instructed but it is not his duty to invent a defence, or to
tamper with facts."".9 For example, in the case of a client who confesses to the
lawyer and admits guilt, it follows from the principles that the lawyer,
"embarrassed by his client's confidential disclosures,"' 0 may not proceed with
a positive defense. If the client confesses prior to trial, many commentators
would advise the advocate to withdraw unless the client is content, after the
position has been explained, to put forward a negative defense.' The reason
for this advice is that the lawyer "would most certainly be seriously
embarrassed in the conduct of the case and no harm can be done to the accused
by requesting him to retain another advocate."' 2
Modem commentators have questioned the propriety of advocates'
withdrawing and telling the client to seek other representation, suggesting that
"it might amount to encouragement by the first advocate to the client to deceive
the court by giving evidence as to his innocence, with the aid of a second
advocate who commits no breach of professional duty because he is not

114. Ipp, supra note 104, at 67.
115. PAGE, supra note 25, at 16.
116. MARCUS STONE, CROSS-EXAMINATION INCRIMINAL TRIALS 2 (2d ed. 1995).
117. Id.
118. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 364 (quoting J. Boal, from The Guardian,Aug. 24,
1996 & Sept. 5, 7, 1996).
119. PAGE, supra note 25, at 16.
120. STONE, supra note 116, at 3.
121. See JOHN MUNKMAN, THE TECHNIQUE OF ADVOCACY 12 (1991).
122. PAGE, supra note 25, at 18.
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informed as to his guilt."'" In any case, if the admission comes after the trial
has commenced, the advocate may not be able to withdraw without seriously
compromising the position of the accused.
Therefore, the right course is to tell the client the limitations that the
admission places on the defense. The defense has the right to have the charge
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Consistent with this, the advocate "may
passively stand by and watch the court being misled by reason of its failure to
ascertain facts that are within the barrister's knowledge."' 24 The lawyer may
take:
[A]ny objection to the competency of the court, to the form
of the indictment, to the admissibility of any evidence, or to
the sufficiency of the evidence admitted; but it would be
absolutely wrong for the advocate to suggest that some other
person had committed the offence, or to call any evidence
which he must know to be false having regard to the
confession.'25
It would be equally wrong to protest the client's innocence in any way. If the
client consequently "decides to seek the services of another advocate that is his
126
affair."'
Thus, the only type of defense that can be mounted is "a 'legal' type of
defense independent[] of the facts, where this has some prima facie basis in
law, [e.g.] by objecting to the admissibility of crucial evidence or by making
a submission that there is no case to answer."'2 7 The advocate may "test [the
prosecution's] evidence for accuracy, or reliability, but he must not challenge
it as inaccurate, [e.g.] by denying the crime, unless this is based on his
infornation."' 2 An advocate "must not challenge, or try to disprove, facts
which he knows to be accurate."' 29
The classic statement is that ofLord Justice Denning. After acknowledging
that zealous advocacy is appropriate, he emphasized that the barrister must not
knowingly mislead the court and while not judging the correctness of the case
presented, must judge its "honesty."' 30 The obvious example here would be a
client's prior convictions which the lawyer knows about, but the court and the
other side do not. The lawyer may conceal this information, but may not assert
anything false such as a statement that the client is a "man of good character""'

123. SIRDAVIDNAPLEY, THE TECHNIQUE OF PERSUASION 59 (4th ed. 1991).

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

SaifAli v. Sydney Mitchell & Co., 3 All E.R. 1033, 1043 (1978).
PAGE, supra note 25, at 18-19 (quoting a decision of the Bar Council).
NAPLEY, supranote 123, at 59.
STONE, supra note 116, at 3.
Id. at2.

129. Id.
130. Tombling v. Universal Bulb Co., 2 T.L.R. 289, 297 (Eng. C.A. 1951).
131. Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2), 1 All E.R. 614, 630 (1996).
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or a good driver, if he has previous motoring convictions. However, it would
be unprofessional to advise a client on how to give an unresponsive,
obstructionist, but literally true answer in the witness box.'32
In short, "[Counsel] must not take any positive steps or make any positive
statements which mislead the court. A lawyer may not directly or indirectly,
lend himself knowingly to any false story being put before the court."
Similarly, a barrister must not "devise facts which will assist in advancing [his]
client's case."' 33 The advocate must not "devise a defence";3 "call the prisoner
into the witness-box to give evidence that he is innocent";' s or call any other
witness "to prove an alibi or any other positive defence which cannot be true,
having regard to the prisoner's admitted guilt."' 36
Some of the few cases to go to court illustrate the English ideology of
advocacy. In Meek v. Fleming s7 a press photographer claimed damages for
assault and wrongful prosecution against a police officer.' Between the time
the writ was issued and the trial, the defendant police officer had been reduced
in rank from chief inspector to station sergeant because he had been a party to
a deception on a court while in the course of his duty as a police officer.'39 The
defendant's lawyers knew of the demotion in rank, but leading counsel decided
not to inform the court.'" The defendant testified as to his career up to the time
he was a chief inspector, but said nothing about subsequent events. 4' In crossexamination, when he was asked whether he was a chief inspector, he answered
affirmatively, even though it was untrue.142 The plaintiffs counsel and the
judge frequently referred to him as chief inspector, and nothing was done to
disabuse them, though the defense counsel referred to him as Mister. 43 It was
held that the court had been misled and the judgment should be set aside.'"
In Ernst & Young v. Butte Mining45 a default judgment had been set aside
by the court, thus enabling the defendant to serve a defense and counterclaim

132. In Tomblingv. UniversalBulbCo., 2 T.L.R. 289 (Eng. C.A. 1951) a prisoner was asked
by his lawyer in court not where he lived-the answer being prison-but instead was asked if he
lived at the prison's address. Id. Contra Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 361 (1973)
(holdingthat the federal perjury statute does not cover literally true answers that are unresponsive
"but untrue only by 'negative implication"').
133. BAR CODE, supra note 1, para. 610(d); see also GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, supranote 1,at para. 6.6 (indicating support for professionalism in client questioning).
134. STONE, supra note 116, at 2.
135. MUNKMAN, supra note 121, at 11 (indicating that "such a course would make counsel
an accessory to the prisoner's perjury").
136. Id.
137. 2 Q.B. 366 (Eng. C.A. 1961).
138. Id. at 374.
139. Id. at 375.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 376.
142. Id.
143. Meek, 2 Q.B. at 396.
144. Id. at 380, 383-84.
145. 2 All E.R. 623 (Ch. 1996).
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within a set time."4 However, the defendants did not file a counterclaim
because the plaintiff filed a notice to discontinue the action.'47 The plaintiff's
solicitors had misled the defendants and sought an unfair advantage. According
to the judge:
Heavy, hostile commercial litigation is a serious business. It
is not a form of indoor sport, and litigation solicitors do not
owe each other duties to be friendly (so far as that goes
beyond politeness) or to be chivalrous or sportsmanlike (so
far as that goes beyond being fair). Nevertheless even in the
most hostile litigation.., solicitors must be scrupulously fair
and not take unfair advantage of obvious mistakes. This duty
is intensified if the solicitor in question has been a major
contributing cause of the mistake.'48
In Haiseldenv. P & 0 Properties,Ltd.149 a case was mistakenly set for trial
in the county court where the so-called "English" rule applied, which would
normally require the loser to pay the winner's legal costs. 5 The case should
have been sent to small claims court, where a no-costs rule applied.' The
defendant solicitors, aware of the error, did not inform the court, which was
responsible for the error, nor the plaintiff, who was unrepresented. 5 At the
trial, the plaintiff lost, and costs were awarded against him.'53 The plaintiff had
the costs order set aside on the basis that there4 should never have been a court
trial, but a small claims arbitration instead.1
In Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2)" s the plaintiff claimed damages for posttraumatic stress disorder after witnessing the death of two children in an
accident. 6 Evidence in separate family proceedings, the judgment of which
was delivered prior to the personal injury litigationjudgment, revealed that the
plaintiff had substantially, if not fully, recovered.'57 This changed prognosis
was not communicated to the defendant, the judge, or the Court of Appeal in
the personal injury litigation.' 58 The question was whether the plaintiff was
under a duty to disclose the changes.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 639.
149 SJ.L.B. 158 (Eng. C.A. 1998).
Law Reports: Costs, LAW Soc'y GAZETrE (London), May 28, 1998, at 37.
Haiselden, 149 S.J.L.B. at 158.
Id.
Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
1 All E.R. 614 (C.A. 1997).
Id. at 617-18.
Id. at619.

158. Id. at 620-21.
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Lord Justice Stuart-Smith explained that "where the case has been
conducted on the basis of certain material facts which are an essential part of
the party's case," that party's lawyers have a duty to correct the court's
understanding where, before judgment, the facts are discovered to be
different. 59 The court held that counsel has a duty to advise a client that
disclosure should be made." If the client refuses, the lawyer should not,
according to Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, make the disclosure himself, but should
withdraw. 6' According to Lord Justice Thorpe, in those circumstances, the
lawyer has a duty to disclose the relevant material to opposing counsel and,
unless the parties agree not to, to the judge.'62 In short, it is the "duty of every
litigant not to mislead the court or his opponent."' 63
C. Using the English Experience as a Way to Create Professional
Responsibility
Despite similar professional rules in the United States and England,' the
two countries do appear to have different ethos regarding conflict scenarios. In
England, "winning at all costs is unacceptable."' 65 The English duty not to
mislead on the facts and, indeed, to disclose facts which ought to be drawn to
the court's attention, may conflict with the lawyer's duty of confidentiality to
the client. As far as judges are concerned, "When this [conflict] occurs, the
duty to the court is paramount.""' Accordingly, "tactical concealment of the
truth" is difficult to justify. 67 A duty is owed to the court, and independent
judgment in the conduct and management of a case is needed because the
adversarial administration of justice is based upon the faithful exercise of that

159. Id. at 630.
160. Id. at 631, 654.
161. Vernon, 1 All E.R. at 631.
162. Id. at 654.
163. Id. at 629; see also Ipp, supranote 104, at 68-69 ("On this reasoning, it is arguable by
analogy that counsel is not entitled to conceal from the court statements from expert witnesses
which are inconsistent with the positive case presented by them.").
164. ModelRule 1.2(d) states that alawyer shall not assist aclient in conduct that the lawyer
knows is fraudulent. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 1.2(d). A comment to Model Rule 3.3
suggests that if a lawyer cooperates with a client in deceiving the court, the lawyer thereby
subverts the "truth-finding process." MODEL RULES, supranote 3, at R. 3.3 emt. 6. Another rule
states that a lawyer shall not assert an issue that is frivolous, but can defend in a criminal
proceeding so "as to require that every element ofthe case be established." MODEL RULES, supra
note 3,at R. 3.1. Further, the ModelRules also hold that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement offact or law, fail to disclose legal authority known to be directly adverse to the client's
position and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 3.3(a)(1), (3), (4); see also MODEL CODE, supranote 1,
at EC 7-23. The Model Code provides that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly make a false statement
of law or fact." MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at DR 7-102(A)(5).
165. STONE, supra note 116, at 2.
166. Ipp, supra note 104, at 67 (citing Rondel v. Worsley, 1 A.C. 191,227 (1969)).
167. Id. at 71.
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judgment.16 By contrast, in the United States, the potentially conflicting duties
to the client and to the legal system "are169 the same: to represent [the] client
zealously within the bounds of the law."'
The different ethos are reflected in Freedman's analysis of the Sprung
case. 7 ' According to Freedman, the client's instructions not to tell the
defendant's lawyer meant that the lawyer was ethically obliged to obey. 17' In
support, he cited Model Rule 1.6, concerning confidentiality of information,
and Model Code Disciplinary Rule 4-101 concerning preservation of
confidences and secrets of a client. 72
By contrast, in England and Wales the rule, set in the wider context of
professional principles, leads to exactly the opposite conclusion as to what the
lawyer should do. "Because of the doctrine of legal professional privilege,
which shields from outside eyes what passes between lawyer and client, the
observance by the lawyer of his duty to the court is of particular
importance."' 73
How has this different ethos developed? If it is not a product of
professional rules, nor of a different conception of the lawyer's role, could it
be the product of a different culture operating within a similar adversary
system? And if so, is it an example of the role of "collegial influence" in
professional practice?
Barristers are members of a close-knit professional community made up
of fellow barristers and judges (most of whom, at the senior level, are exbarristers). Each barrister must join one of the four Inns of Court in London,
where the vast majority of practicing barristers are located. The Inns are small

168. See Lord Templeman, The Advocate and the Judge, 2 LEGAL ETHics 11 (1999).
169. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at EC 7-19; see also James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role,
Agency Law, andthe Characterization"Officer ofthe Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349,350 (2000)
("[I]n our adversary system the lawyer's duty to the court is almost entirely harmonious with the
lawyer's duty as agent for her client.").
170. EthicalDanger,supranote 58, at 18.
171. Id.
172. Id. I find it very difficult, on any reading of these rules, to see how confidentiality
justifies the decision not to communicate with the other side. ModelRule 1.6 states that a lawyer
shall notreveal information "relating to the representation of a client." MODELRULES, supranote
3, at R. 1.6(a). Disciplinary Rule 4-101 refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege or other information gained in the professional relationship. MODEL CODE, supra note
1, at DR 4-101. Arguably, the crucial "information" here-that the defendant lawyer was
proceeding on an erroneous assumption-had nothing to do with the lawyer-client relationship:
it was not the client's information. Confidentiality was also the "card" played by the "legal
establishment" to defend the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, & Handler in the Lincoln
Savings & Loan liquidation. See William H. Simon, TheKaye ScholerAffair The Lawyer'sfDuty
of Candorand theBar's TemptationsofEvasion andApology,23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243,259
(1998) [hereinafter The Kaye ScholerAffair].
173. COMM. ON THE FuTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A TIME FOR CHANGE para. 6.6

(1988). This reportwas the product ofan inquiry into the legal profession sponsoredjointly by the
Bar Council (barristers) and the Law Society (solicitors). Id. at para. 2.2; see also Tombling v.
Universal Bulb Co., 2 T.L.R. 289 (Eng. C.A. 1951) (discussing the lawyer's duty to inform the
court of certain facts).
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and within them, collective norms are expressed overtly-via interaction
within the community-and symbolically-via the wearing of the wig and the
gown, representing the advocates' independence and their role as officers ofthe
court. Norms are created not just in the form of professional codes, but also as
part of a collective culture.
While it is up to the individual advocate to exercise professional judgment,
the norms are clear and well understood. Indeed, "if there is any legal
profession whose culture can be identified with some precision, it is surely this
one. ' 174 In ideological terms, the spirit of the Bar Code is strictly adhered to.
Even though there may be noncompliance with symbolic as well as substantive
aspects in practice,' 75 banisters know what they should do. They know when
they and their colleagues are not in compliance with their professional duties.
In short,
"[n]owhere is the notion of legal culture stronger than at the English
176
Bar.'

In this environment, the foundations of professionalism lie within the
collective community culture. Through this culture, norms are established,
professional values absorbed, and lawyer behavior monitored. Of course, the
structure and organization of the English bar cannot be replicated in the United
States, 77 but this comparison with the English experience does suggest a way
to view professionalism and thereby to create professional responsibility.
III.

CREATING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Professional responsibility should be based upon an individual lawyer's
exercise of professional judgment. The exercise of professional judgment, by
definition, constitutes a rejection of legalism and narrow rule-following. In
Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2)"" it was submitted by counsel that, in determining
what to do when faced with a conflict between client and court, counsel must
only look to the authorities and apply them to the circumstances-the counsel
was not to be guided by his own feelings on the issue in question. 79 Lord
Justice Thorpe disagreed. He could not "accept that counsel's approach should

174. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 69 (quoting H. W. Arthurs, Lawyering in Canadain

the 21st Century, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS To JUST. 202, 223). If there are doubts as to the right
thing to do, barristers can ask for advice on the telephone "Helpline" which offers expertpractical
guidance on ethical conflicts.
175. The cab-rank rule, for one, is certainly not always complied with. See PANNICK, supra
note 48, at 135-47.
176. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 69.
177. Several structural factors may enhance the independence of barristers. For example,
barristers are self-employed independent contractors: they work for themselves and are not
allowed to form partnerships. Their relationship with clients is mediated by solicitors. Many
barristers aspire to the bench. And until last year, they could not be sued for negligent advocacy.
Arthur J.S. Hall & Co.v. Simons, 3 All E.R. 673, 685-86, 707, 751 (H.L. 2000).
178. 1 All E.R. 614 (C.A. 1997).

179. Id. at 653.
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be so strictly cerebral."' 80 Instead, he stated, "There is a value in instinctive and
intuitive judgment. The more difficult the decision the greater that value. The
course that feels wrong is unlikely to be the safe course to follow."' In other
words, the judge trusted the lawyer and had confidence in the decision the
barrister would make instinctively and intuitively. An "advocate is expected to
sense when his or her behaviour might undermine justice."' 82
This approach endorses the view that professional codes cannot, in
complex scenarios, provide definitive answers to ethical conflicts.' It is a
recognition that values sometimes conflict and there is not a single solution to
an ethical dilemma.'" "Professional" choices in complex conflict of duty
scenarios cannot be resolved by following a simple rule. If they could, there
would be no conflict. The professional response depends upon the
circumstances, and it is for the individual barrister to weigh the factors and
determine the matter. The barrister "is individually and personally responsible
for his own conduct and for his professional work: he must exercise his own
personal judgment in all his professional activities."' 5 In court, the barrister is
"personally responsible for the conduct and presentation of his case and must
exercise personal judgement upon the substance and purpose of statements
made and questions asked."' 86
To some, this may sound less like professional responsibility and more like
a personal ethic' 7 or "ethical discretion in lawyering."' 88 William H. Simon
argued that lawyers should use their own individual judgment and discretion
in selecting and representing clients, including determining for themselves how
to dojustice-akind of "non-professional advocacy."'8 9 Critics of Simon warn
of the possible dangers, both to clients in the form of lawyer paternalism 9 " and
to lawyers in the form of exposure to malpractice suits.'

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. BooN & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 355-56.
183. See, e.g.,Ideology,supranote49, at 121 (discussing the"tensionbetweenindividuality
and stability"); Wendel, supra note 17, at 11 ("The rules do not cover the waterfront.").
184. See W. Bradley Wendel, ProfessionalRoles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L. J. 667
(2001) (review essay).
185. BAR CODE, supranote 1,at para. 206.
186. Id. at para. 610(a).
187. See, e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 1,at Preamble("Each lawyer must find within his
own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise
above minimum standards.").
188. EthicalDiscretion,supranote 50, at 1085-86; see also BOON&LEVIN,supra note 8,
at 355.
189. Ideology, supra note 49, at 130-3 1.
190. Ethics by the PervasiveMethod, supra note 9, at 48-49.
191. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Dawson, 2 Fam. 315 (1993) (holding that a solicitor who failed
to oppose a divorce petition because itwouldbe "unsporting" was held to be negligent). Note, too,
that in the United States, there is a trend towards using ethical standards to determine the standard
of professional care.
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Arguably, this is the essence of professional responsibility. The exercise
of professional judgment by an individual lawyer demands the mindful
application of professional norms in difficult, grey, unpredictable,
idiosyncratic, and complex areas where honest differences and real conflicts of
opinion are legitimate. It means making judgments guided not exclusively by
money, convenience, or what the client wants, but also by a professional ethic.
Arguably, true professionalism is: lawyer "independence [as] a matter of
ethos, professional discipline and frame of mind, rather than a matter of how
a lawyer is engaged or paid."'"
Thus professional misconductby abarristeris notjust noncompliance with
a rule, but "something which was dishonourable to him as a man and
dishonourable in the profession."' 93 An advocate's duty is "not to fight
unfairly, and that [duty] arose from his duty to himself not to do anything
which was degrading to himself as a gentleman and a man of honour."' 94 This
may seem anachronistic at best, naive at worst. Many would not trust
professionals to do the right thing unless it also benefitted the professional.' 95
It seems to ignore economics and assume that all lawyers are scrupulous. 96
Yet, at the English bar, it seems to work, at least when it comes to the
resolution of conflicting professional duties. Barristers have managed to attain
an "'extremely high' 'standard of honour."""9 Professional judgment can be
required of a barrister and effectively enforced. Could the exercise of
professional judgment be extended to other areas of legal practice in England
and in the United States? Recently in England, reforms to the legal profession
have enabled solicitors, who so wish, to obtain rights of audience and full
advocacy rights in all the courts where barristers traditionally held exclusive
rights. 9 ' Although they do not join an Inn of Court, nor are they socialized in
the same way as barristers, solicitors are expected to adhere to the same
professional norms and to exercise professional judgment in the same way in
their role as advocates.

192. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS OF AUDIENCE AND RIGHTS TO CONDUCT

R. 2.9 (June 1998), available at
http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/consult/genera/rofa/rofafr.btm.
193. In re G. Mayor-Cooke, 5 T.L.R. 407,408 (1889).
194. Id.
195. See ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 35-39.
196. Nathan M. Crystal, Remarks at the National Conference on Enhancing the
ProfessionalismofLawyers: Can Commissions, Committees, and Centers Make a Difference?
(Oct. 20-21, 2000) ("[Ijfprofessionalism ignores market forces, it is doomed to be irrelevant.");
seealso EthicalPerspectives,supranote 10, at635 ("[M]ost lawyers will preferto leave no stone
unturned, provided, of course, they can charge by the stone.").
197. Revisioning Lawyers, supra note 10, at 17 (citing PROFESSION IN THEORY AND
HISTORY: RETHINKING THE STUDY OF THE PROFESSIONS (Michael Burrage & Rolf Torstendahl
eds., 1990)).
198. See COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT, c.41, §§ 31-33 (1990) (Eng.), amended by
ACCESSTOJUSTICE ACT, c.22, § 36 (1999) (Eng.). This is subject to meeting prescribed training
before or after qualification. Id.
LITIGATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE WAY AHEAD,
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Solicitors must not permit their absolute independence and freedom from
external pressures to be compromised or compromise their professional
standards in order to please their clients, the court, or third parties."9 Though
the solicitor may be an employee or a partner within a law firm, the Law
Society's Codestresses that solicitor advocates are "individually and personally
responsible for their own conduct and for professional work: they must
exercise their own professional judgment in all their professional activities and
must not delegate such responsibility to another advocate." 2" The cab-rank
principle applies.2"' Solicitor advocates can be professionally embarrassed and
should not take a case or should withdraw from one if an obligation is imposed
on the advocate to act other than in conformity with the provisions of the Law
Society's Code. 2
It is too early to say for sure whether or not solicitor advocates will act
with the same high degree of honor as barristers do; relatively few solicitors
have so far qualified as advocates. However, there is certainly no evidence so
far of any shortfall in behavior by those who have qualified. Apparently,
solicitors have encountered few problems in their transition to solicitor
advocates. In other areas of legal practice, solicitors have constructed their own
professionalism based on a clear perspective of what a good lawyer looks like.
For example, in personal injury cases, a culture of cooperation had
developed between general practice solicitors and insurance companies;
settlement-oriented bargaining rather than "zealous advocacy for the client"
had become the norm. 0 3 However, expert plaintiff solicitors have now rejected
the cooperative culture, and "stung by criticisms of the handling of personal
injury work by non-specialists," the Law Society has set up a Personal Injury
Panel, dominated by leading firms.2 There are economic incentives to join,
including access to cases referred from the Law Society's "Accident Line"
service and to the Law Society's organized insurance schemes for no-win, nofee cases. 0 ' However, applicants to the Panel are vetted, to ensure they meet
quality thresholds.0 6 More importantly, they also have to accept a different
culture if they wish to remain accredited.

199.
200.
201.
202.

GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note I, at para. 2.6.
Id. at para. 2.7.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 1, at para. 4.1 (c).

203. HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT INPERSONAL INJURY

ACTIONS 27-28 (1987).
204. BOON & LEVIN, supranote 8, at 83.
205. See id. at 323; Andy Boon, Ethics andStrategy in PersonalInjury Litigation, 22 J. L.
& Soc'Y 353, 355 (1995).
206. To get on to the Panel, applicants must show that they have conducted at least sixty
personal injury cases within theprevious five years, oratleast thirty-six within the previous three,
and that at least ten cases must have been set down for trial. BOON & LEVIN, supranote 8, at 323
n.43. However, the requirement that applicants take atleast five cases to trial during the preceding
five years was dropped in February of 1995. Id. at 322 n.41; Boon, supra note 204, at 356.
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The Personal Injury Panel "selection criteria included norms which
reflected and reinforced the norms of this elite practitioner group. 20 7
Applicants must be ready to go to trial if need be and should proceed on the
basis that the case will reach trial and not be settled.208 In other words, the
Panel "sought to establish powerful practice norms. Indeed, by using the power
of exclusion the Panel set up norms which were arguably more powerful than
the ethical rules of the Law Society.' '2 9 It chose "the adversarial ethic and the
litigation first strategy as its practical manifestation. ' 210 The Panel thus
endorses or creates professional norms which form part of the ethical
framework ofpractice. 21 The Law Society has also established other panels in
which other practice norms have been established.212
This is professionalism at work-the creation of apractice norm which can
be imposed on the professional community. Also in the United States, there
apparently is "an extraordinarily rich self-regulatory system that has grown up
'on the ground' in varied legal practice settings. 21 a It is thus not only in the
rarefied atmosphere of the English bar that a professional culture and a
collegial community can be created, though it might be more difficult to
achieve elsewhere. If this kind of professional responsibility-the requirement
to exercise professional judgment-is deemed appropriate, how can it be
achieved in other areas of legal practice? What are the challenges that must be
overcome?
First, the bar will have to develop professional principles. The practice
norms thus created will inevitably reflect the community context of the
particular area of practice. How lawyers respond to conflicts will differ from
one area of practice to another. As Lord Justice Thorpe explained, "Differing
practices and procedures in the family justice system, the criminal justice
system, and the civil justice system must be reflected in different requirements
in, for instance, a criminal trial and a Children Act hearing.""21

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 83.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Medical negligence, family law, planning, children and mental health review tribunals

have been established. Id. at 83 n.77.
213. Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Pushfor a New Legal
Realism, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237, 240 (1998) (referring to a study undertaken by Susan
Shapiro for the American Bar Foundation).
214. Vernon v. Bosley (No. 2), 1 All E.R. 614, 653 (C.A. 1997).
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This is not surprising; the world of legal practice is extremely diverse."'

The legal profession is stratified and heterogeneous.2" 6 It is not surprising that,
in both the United States and England, lawyers' groups have established
associations, usually reflecting the area in which they work.21v Although these
lawyers' groups serve a variety of functions-social, intellectual,
representative-some, as we have seen, have also begun to develop their own
codes of ethics.2"' Since "lawyers' decisions about their work appear to be
rooted in the varying work contexts themselves,"2 9 there needs to be "ethical
pluralism." ' Ethical norms must reflect the environment in which professions
operate." Within discrete professional communities, the principles ofpractice
should be determined and guidance provided to fill out the meaning and to help
interpretation. Professionalism, as defined in this Article, acknowledges and
legitimates this professional diversity. Professionalism is a way to establish a
sense of collective responsibility to empower the individual lawyer in the
lawyer-client relationship.
Second, these principles must be imposed on the professional community.
This might be done through controls over the admission to specialist panels, the
licensing of particular areas of practice, or other forms of goverance. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate alternative approaches, but the
issue of who should regulate lawyers, while always important, is particularly
crucial if the aim is to enhance professionalism.' m
Finally, as a professional ethos, all lawyers within the group should be
compelled to adhere to the proposed principles.' This may be difficult to
achieve for two reasons. First, lawyers may resist the principles. For example,
when efforts were made to impose a duty of frankness and disclosure in family

215. See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHics: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR (1966); MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE GROWTH
AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1994); CARROLL SERON, THE
BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATrORNEYS (1996);

Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice,and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm,37 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1985); Jerry Van Hoy, Selling and
ProcessingLaw: Legal Work at FranchiseLaw Firms, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 703 (1995).
216. See ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 202-11.
217. Examples in England include the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) and
the Healthcare Lawyers Association. Examples in the United States include the Association of
Trial Lawyers ofAmerica, the American Corporate Counsel Association, the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers.
218. APIL is one example. See BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 92.
219. Maiman et al., supra note 15, at 74.
220. Ted Schneyer, Professionalismas BarPolitics: The Making of the Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 677 (1989).
221. BOON & LEvN, supra note 8, at 69-70 (referring to Hazard, supra note 85, at 124 1).
222. See generallyDavid B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv L. REV.
799, 801-87 (1992) (addressing the issue of which systems should enforce the ethical duties of
lawyers).
223. Osiel, supra note 14, at 2016.
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disputes and disputes involving children, they were "met with strenuous
resistance, being described as 'the attempt to convert the lawyer routinely into
an informer against his client. '"' "4 Second, lawyers may challenge the legal
enforceability of professional judgment.
A recent case illustrates the problem. Finkelstein, a plaintiffs attorney,
represented eleven employees in an employment discrimination suit.2 At trial,
the jury found in favor of two of the eleven employees." 6 A hearing date was
set for the damages portion of the trial, and the court invited the parties to
discuss settlement in the interim.' Finkelstein, bypassing the trial defense
lawyers, wrote to the general counsel of the defendant company.2" The letter
contained a variety of statements, which a federal district court found to be
threatening and an attempt to remove the resolution of the case from the
court.229
As a result of his "unprofessional conduct," Finkelstein was suspended
from practice for a period of six months."o However, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit (Senior District Judge Lynne, sitting by designation)
vacated the order of suspension on appeal."I The judge stated that, although
the letter "displayed a gross misunderstanding of true professionalism, ' 2 2 "[i]n
order to satisfy traditional notions of due process, the conduct prohibited must
be ascertainable. '""i Rather than relying upon a specific rule, the district court
"depended entirely upon a 'code by which an attorney practices which
transcends any written code of professional conduct."' 4 According to Judge
Lynne, "The fatal flaw with this transcendental code of conduct is that it
existed only in the subjective opinion of the court, of which appellant had no

224. Ipp, supra note 104, at 71 (citing Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and
Responsibility in Modern Society, 30 REc. ASS'N B. CmTY N.Y. 534, 542 (1975)).
225. In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1990).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1563. The letter stated the terms of settlement relative to each of the eleven
plaintiffs.Id at 1562. Finkelstein requested $500,000 in attorney's fees oran amount equal to the
amountpaid by the company to its defense counsel. Id. According to the district court, Finkelstein
then "injected thejudicial process with pressure group politics." Id. at 1565. Statements included
the following: that further litigation would tarnish the public image of the company (the attorney
stated he would seek damages); that the NAACP and SCLC might find it interesting to hear ofthe
testimony that the company successfully kept from the jury; that Finkelstein's childhood friend
is a producer for ABC news and is interested in good stories; that there are "more cases coming";
thatifasettlement is notreached, Finkelstein's clients plan to sue; and Finkelsteinplans to contact
the local union organizers and send them to the company's plant. Id. at 1562-63.
230. Id. at 1563.
231. In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d at 1565.
232. Id. at 1564 n.4.
233. Id. at 1564 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963)).
234. Id. at 1565.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 14
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 697

notice, and was the sole basis of the sanction administered after the conduct
had occurred." '
The difficulties apparent in Finkelsteinreinforce, rather than undermine,
the argument presented here. To overcome resistance and challenge, a clear
professional culture must be constructed. This can only be effectively done
within appropriate professional communities or subdivisions. When these
communities or subdivisions are identified, clear principles must be
established. Because no one admits to acting in bad faith or unprofessionally,
regulators and enforcers need to be able to see through and reject such counterclaims without being overbearing or arbitrary. The transcendental code needs
to exist in the subjective opinion of the lawyer.If the community is appropriate
and the principles are clear, there is a greater chance that the principles will be
legally enforceable.
Achieving this goal will not be easy. "[L]ocal communities of practice are
typically fluid and informal. They are not organised to promote collegial
influence in any formalised, self-conscious sense." 6 But it may not be
impossible. 7 There are examples in the United Kingdom of what might be
called "transcendental regulation," which clearly set out exactly what kind of
professional judgment should be exercised by professionals advising clients of
their legal duties. It specifically attacks legalism and "creative compliance,"" 8
the attempt to escape legal obligations by playing with the letter of the law or
with the absence of prescriptive rules. 9 This kind of regulation can certainly
achieve a significant change in practice.' However, its ultimate legal
enforceability remains to be determined, as does the question of whether such
regulation can be sustained in the face of strong opposition.24
IV. CONCLUSION

Demanding the exercise of professional judgment by lawyers should not
be seen as an add-on to professional conduct or just another professional

235. Id.
236. Maiman et al., supra note 15, at 83.
237. See, e.g., Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: EthicalCommunity Lawyering,7
CLnlcALL. REv. 147 (2000) (addressing conflicts between traditional ethics rules and the values
of community lawyering and advocating development of an ethical framework resolving these
conflicts).
238. See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law:
Formalism and the Strugglefor Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848 (1991) (discussing new
antiformalistic approaches to accounting practices regulation).
239. Id. at 849.
240. See DOREEN McBARNET& CHRISTOPHERWHELAN, CREATIVE AccOUNTING AND THE
CROSS-EYED JAVELIN THROWER (1999).
241. See McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 238, at 870-71.
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aspiration. 2 It is the very nature of being a professional. When we talk about
reconciling conflicting duties, we are not, generally, talking about flagrant
abuse of professional rules or ethics, but about the need to "do the right thing."
In other words, no matter how mighty the sanctions, powerful the enforcement,
or zero tolerance used, it is difficult to make regulations effective in gray areas
or where there are honest differences of opinion. These are the areas in which
all lawyers will argue that they acted professionally and in good faith even
when they know they did not.
Therefore, professional responsibility entails the mindful application of
principles. The recent trend for ethical norms to become legalized as narrow
rules' may thus serve to undermine, rather than enhance, the professionalism
of lawyers. 2' Principles are the only way to capture complex areas that cannot
be reduced to simple rules. Principles can be used to fill regulatory gaps and
to deal with situations not seen before, including innovations in practice or
procedure. Indeed, principles may be the only way.245
Much of the argument in this Article is by no means new."4 Over sixty
years ago, Judge Robert N. Wilkin told students at the Ohio State College of
Law that the spirit of the legal profession "is transmitted, now as always, by
association. It cannot be taught like the rule in Shelley's case, or the defmition
of murder. It is too great and too vital for defmition."'247 Of course, since then,
individual autonomy of lawyer, law firm, and client has grown and the "spirit
of the profession" has declined.24 However, comparative analysis does remind

242. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at R. 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to the law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social
and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." (emphasis added)); MODEL
CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 5 ("A [l]awyer [s]hould [e]xercise [i]ndependent [p]rofessional
[j]udgment on [b]ehalfofa [c]lient.);see alsoid.at DR 7-101(B)(1) (stating that an attorney may
exercise professional judgment in waiving or failing to assert a client's right or position).
243. Hazard, supranote 85, at 1241; see also Smith v. Haden, 872 F. Supp. 1040, 1045
(D.D.C. 1994) (denying defendant's motion to strike expert testimony as to standard ofcare based
on ethics rules).
244. See Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Understandingthe Differences in PerceptionsofLawyer Codes ofConduct by U.S. andForeign
Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1138 (1999).
245. See Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1,3
(1995) (observing that the covert inducement of witnesses to testify falsely "must therefore be
controlled by a lawyer's own informed conscience").
246. See Maiman et al., supra note 15, at 83, 85 ("Workplace communities ofpractice are
potentially much more powerful devices of control than the bar as a whole.... The challenge for
professionalism is to find ways to support and institutionalise deliberativejudgement in practice
and to provide collegial support for it.").
247. ROBERT N. WILKIN, THE SPIRIT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 173 (1938).
248. The American Corporate Counsel Association illustrates this well. It represents over
10,000 lawyers who work in 4,500 private sector organizations and has a branch in Europe. See
Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,EthicalandLegalChallengesinLawyersfor a Global Organization:
The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L. REv. 1057 (arguing the importance of these
lawyers retaining professional identities).
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us that lawyer behavior can be changed, not by rule changes in professional
codes, but by creating a professional responsibility in which the individual has
the duty to exercise professional judgment.
The exercise of professional judgment has to be guided by principles.
These principles have to be agreed upon (though ultimately choices may have
to be made between competing understandings), understood (and
contextualized), imposed (to catch "bad lawyers"), enforced (and be seen to be
enforced), and enforceable. None of this will be easy. More research is needed
to better understand "how practicing attorneys identify, negotiate around, and
respond to ethical dilemmas in their everyday experiences .... [I]t is only

through a conversation that brings together many threads-empirical,
theoretical, practical-that the next generation of legal ethicists can move the
debate to a new level. 249
But the aim should be clear-to require the exercise of professional
judgment. As Roscoe Pound stated:
In order to further justice, in order to insure that the
machinery of justice is not perverted, those who operate the
machinery must not merely know how to operate it, they
must have a deep sense of things that are done and things
that are not done. They need the guiding restraint of the
professional spirit to prevent misuse of the machinery, to
prevent waste of public time in useless wrangling, to promote
proper forensic treatment of witnesses so that
witnesses will
250
not be unwilling to come forward to testify.
Translating this aim into an operational reality appears to have been realized
at the English bar, and it is a model to which many commentators have
implicitly lent support.
Creating, or re-creating, professional responsibility in the twenty-first
century is undoubtedly a daunting challenge. There is little prospect of a return
to some kind of aristocratic ideal, where higher, non-commercial values and a
public spirit predominate. Economic realities may preclude the return, though
such pressures make the task even more important.25' Political motivation may

249. Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a New Legal
Realism, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 237, 241 (1998); see also Donald C. Langevoort, What Was
Kaye Scholer Thinking?,23 LAW&SOC. INQUIRY 297, 302 (1998) (stating it is important to know
how "lawyers think in practice, especially on matters relating to ethics and social
responsibility.... When we understand lawyering better, we will have more insight into what it
will take to improve the prevailing ethos.").
250. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMEs: WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAR AssocIATIoNs IN THE UNITED STATES

26 (1953) (emphasis added).
251. BOON & LEVIN, supra note 8,at 89 ("A competitive environment reinforces the need

for support.").
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also be lacking. 2 In any case, maybe the ideal never really existed, at least not
in any pure form, either here or in England. However, demanding the exercise
of professional judgment and grounding it in principles developed, though not
necessarily determined, by lawyers in practice may be a small step in the right
direction, at least as far as ethical conflicts in legal practice are concerned.

252. See The Kaye ScholerAffair, supranote 172, at 276-80, and Gordon, supranote 12,
for a discussion of the questions raised about the "legal establishment" after the Kaye Scholer
"affair."
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